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FILARTIGA V. PENA-IRALA AFTER TEN YEARS: MAJOR
BREAKTHROUGH OR LEGAL ODDITY?
Karen E. Holt*
Whenever there is a landmark case, in any field, there is a tendency
for scholars and would-be scholars to rush to interpret it, predict its
effect, and conclude whether it is good or bad law from their per-
spective. In cases addressing issues on human rights, the United States
case which has engendered the most attention is Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala,l a 1980 decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. After
ten years, it is a good time to assess the impact of Filartiga and the
interpretations and decisions which followed. In doing so, I will try
to avoid the trap of concluding that Filartiga was a "good' or a
"bad" decision, and will focus instead on identifying the issues and
concerns which have been raised.
In Part I, I will discuss the Filartiga case itself, and follow with
an examination of reaction to the case in Part II. Part III will discuss
the two significant cases decided since Filartiga which have narrowed
its application in other situations, and Part IV will examine cases
relying on Filartiga. I conclude with a summary of what can be said
about the continued reliance on Filartiga by persons seeking to redress
alleged human rights violations.
I. THE FILARTIGA DECISIONS
Dr. Joel Filartiga and his daughter, Dolly, were citizens of Paraguay
during the administration of President Alfredo Stroessner, whose
government Dr. Filartiga had long opposed. 2 On March 29, 1976,
the Filartigas alleged that Dr. Filartiga's son, Joelito, was kidnapped
and tortured to death by Americo Norberto Pena-Irala, then Inspector
General of Police in Asuncion, Paraguay. Dolly was shown her
brother's body at Pena-Irala's home, and told by him "[h]ere you
have what you have been looking for for so long and what you
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630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), on remand, 577 F.Supp. 860 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
2 630 F.2d at 878.
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deserve. Now shut up." It was the Filartiga's belief that Joelito was
killed in retaliation for Dr. Filartiga's political activities. 3
Dr. Filartiga initiated a criminal action against Pena-Irala in Par-
aguay, which resulted in the arrest of Filartiga's attorney and threats
against the attorney by Pena-Irala. The attorney was subsequently
disbarred. While the criminal action was pending, a member of Pena-
Irala's household confessed to the crime, stating that it was a crime
of passion. Despite his confession, he was not convicted or sentenced.4
The Filartigas and Pena-Irala separately came to the United States
in 1978. Dolly subsequently learned that Pena-Irala had outstayed
his visa and notified the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS), who ordered him deported.5 While Pena-Irala was being held
pending deportation, the Filartigas filed suit against him for Joelito's
death in the Federal Court for the Eastern District of New York.
The Filartigas brought their action under wrongful death statutes,
the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the
UN Declaration Against Torture, the American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 and the United States
Constitution. 6 Section 1350, also known as the Alien Tort Statute,
provides that "[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation
of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." 7
Pena-Irala moved to dismiss the action for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and forum non conveniens (Paraguay being the more
appropriate place for the action). The district court granted Pena-
Irala's motion, dismissing for lack of jurisdiction. While the district
court accepted the Filartigas' argument that torture violated the law
of nations, it felt bound by two recent decisions of the Second Circuit
which implied that a state's treatment of its own citizens could not
amount to a violation of "the law of nations."'
In the belief that the Alien Tort Statute provided their best hope
to establish federal jurisdiction, the Filartigas framed the issue on
appeal as whether Pena-Irala's alleged conduct violated the law of
'Id.
4Id.
Id. at 879.
6 Id.
I Alien Tort Statute, Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 77 (1789) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350 (1948)).
a Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976);
iT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
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nations.9 Despite their attempts to stay Pena-Irala's deportation, he
was deported prior to the appellate decision.' 0
The Second Circuit agreed with the Filartigas' position, stating that
"an act of torture committed by a state official against one held in
detention violates established norms of the international law of human
rights, and hence the law of nations."" In 1820, the United States
Supreme Court had stated that the law of nations "may be ascertained
by consulting the works of jurists, writing professedly on public law;
or by the general usage and practice of nations; or by judicial decisions
recognizing and enforcing that law.' ' 2 This principle was adopted
and amplified by The Paquete Habana,13 a 1900 case which held that
examination of such works is not to determine what the law ought
to be, "but for trustworthy evidence of what the law really is. ' 4
The Filartiga court stated that its job was not to determine what,
was considered a violation of the law of nations in 1789, but to
determine how that law has evolved and exists today.' 5 In determining
how torture is viewed, the court pointed to the universality of con-
demnation of torture, or at the least deprivation of basic human
rights, in the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected
to Torture, and the American Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms. 6 Further, the court noted that torture was
prohibited (or a prohibition could be implied) by the constitutions
of at least fifty-five countries, including Paraguay. 7 The court's
conclusion was bolstered by the submission of a brief of the United
States Departments of State and Justice, as amicus curiae, urging
recognition of jurisdiction on the grounds that torture violates the
law of nations. 8
The court rejected Pena-Irala's argument that the court should not
consider the claim because it would infringe on Congressional and
executive authority for international affairs, and also because the tort
630 F.2d at 880.
Id.
Id.
12 Id. (quoting United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160-61 (1820)).
. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
1" Id. at 700 (quoting Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163, 214, 215 (1895)).
"1 630 F.2d at 881.
16 Id. at 881-84.
Id. at 884.
' Id. The brief submitted by the United States is reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 585
(1980).
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arose outside of the United States. 19 Under the clear language of the
Alien Tort Statute, the court said it could consider any claim that
met three conditions: an action by an alien, for a tort, committed
in violation of the law of nations. Actions which could not normally
be considered, the court said, would be ones for fraud, a plane crash,
or child custody. 20
While agreeing that the federal court had jurisdiction, the Second
Circuit had to remand the case for a decision on which law to apply
(probably Paraguayan), whether the claim would be barred by the
act of state doctrine (the court said it doubted that Pena-Irala acted
officially), and forum non conveniens.21
Judge Irving Kaufman, writing for a unanimous panel, concluded
the opinion with a glimpse into his own hope for Filartiga:
Among the rights universally proclaimed by all nations . . . is the
right to be free of physical torture. Indeed, for purposes of civil
liability, the torturer has become-like the pirate and slave trader
before him-hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind. Our
holding today, giving effect to a jurisdictional provision enacted by
our First Congress, is a small but important step in the fulfillment
of the ageless dream to free all people from brutal violence. 22
On remand (in which the deported Pena-Irala took no part), dam-
ages of $5,175,000 were awarded to Dolly, and $5,210,364 to Dr.
Filartiga. 23 Of the amount awarded to each, $5,000,000 was punitive
damages, ironically not recognizable under Paraguayan law. 24
II. REACTION TO FILARTIGA
A. Favorable
One of the most thorough reviews of the Filartiga case was also
one of the earliest. Jeffrey Blum and Ralph Steinhardt came out
with a lengthy analysis of Filartiga soon after its entry, 25 lauding
,9 630 F.2d 876, 885 (2d Cir. 1980), on remand, 577 F. Supp. 860 (E.D.N.Y.
1984).
20 630 F.2d at 888, n.23.
21 Id. at 889-90.
2 Id. at 890.
23 577 F.Supp. 860, 867 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
24 Id. at 865.
21 Blum & Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction Over International Human Rights
Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act After Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 22 HARv. INT'L
L.J. 53 (1981).
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Filartiga as a newer mode of international lawmaking, emphasizing
conventions and declarations as opposed to relying on contrary state
practice. 26 The Filartiga case also represented a shift from a pure
examination of the binding treaty/non-binding treaty dichotomy, re-
lying more on the language of the international proclamations.2 7
The Filartiga court was hailed as one "educated in modern inter-
national law, which recognized its constitutional authority and re-
sponsibility to apply that law in appropriate cases." 28 Filartiga was
a recognition of international law as a part of domestic law, 29 and
reflected the proper, activist role of courts. It was thought that the
participation of the Justice and State Departments would undermine
any future claim that courts should abstain from addressing issues
affecting foreign relations because of policy concerns.3 0 Quite the
opposite was felt to be true-that, as the Department of Justice stated
in its brief, "[a] refusal to recognize a private cause of action in
these circumstances might seriously damage the credibility of our
nation's commitment to the protection of human rights."', Not only
had the Administration been correct in its position, but human rights
specialists within the Administration could act in no other fashion-
they had a duty to advocate a "progressive response," especially in
light of the reference by the United States to the Declaration Against
Torture in the Iranian hostages case.3 2
In the literature, the strength of the holding was also discussed
because an alternative basis for asserting jurisdiction existed-that a
theory of federal policy could support federal jurisdiction in matters
of international significance as a type of "protective jurisdiction,"
to prevent the states from considering sensitive, international ques-
26 Id. at 74.
27 Id.
28 Burke, Coliver, De la Vega, & Rosenbaum, Application of International Human
Rights Law in State and Federal Courts, 18 TEx. INT'L L.J. 291, 321 (1983).
29 Cf. Schneebaum, Human Rights in the Federal Courts: A Review of Recent
Cases, 44 U. PrrT. L. REv. 287 (1983). Schneebaum represented the International
Human Rights Law Group, The Council on Hemispheric Affairs and the Washington
Office on Latin America as amici curiae in the Filartiga case. 630 F.2d at 877.
30 See Case Comment, International Law and Human Rights - Alien Tort Claims
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1350, 66 MINN. L. REv. 357, 368 n. 71 (1982).
31 United States: Memorandum for the United States Submitted to the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 19 I.L.M. 585, 604
(1980)(hereinafter Filartiga Brief).
32 See Lillich, The Role of Domestic Courts in Enforcing International Human
Rights Law, 74 Am. Soc. INT'L L. PROC. 20, 24-25 (1980).
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tions. 33 Regardless of the outcome, bringing a case like Filartiga could
be beneficial by preventing further human rights violations and en-
couraging complaints of violations through the generation of publicity
and media attention.3 4
Judge Kaufman, the author of the Filartiga opinion, aired his own
views of its significance, stating that "the articulations of evolved
norms of international law by the courts form the ethical foundations
for a more enlightened social order." 35 He did not see that courts
would be "transformed into some kind of roaming human rights
commission," ' 36 but that the courts would merely be asked to exercise
their obligation to identify egregious violations of international law,
a task "in many ways analogous to the courts' traditional role in
redressing deprivations of civil liberties that occur at home." '37
There were many predictions about the effect Filartiga would have
on subsequent claims and behavior of victims and perpetrators. Nat-
urally, one subject was what other claims might be construed to
implicate the "laws of nations" under the Alien Tort Statute. Blum
and Steinhardt discussed this thoroughly, concluding that the act
alleged must be the object of concerted international attention; must
be definable and identifiable as a tort committed by individuals (which
would exclude apartheid); must be textually obligatory in instruments;
and must be universally condemned. 38 Applying these criteria, Blum
and Steinhardt believed that genocide, summary execution, and slavery
could be construed to violate the laws of nations. 39 Some advocates,
such as Jordan Paust, went so far as to predict that it "shouldn't
be too much more difficult to prove that blatant racial discrimination
is a violation of international law," and that foreign-state immunity
was a myth.40 Paust's predictions, in contrast to those of Blum and
Steinhardt, illustrate the tendency to overstate Filartiga's impact so
as to bolster pet theories.
11 See Note, Torture as a Tort in Violation of International Law: Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, 33 ST, L. Riv. 353, 360 (1981) (hereinafter Stanford Note).
14 See Rosenbaum, Lawyers Pro Bono Publico: Using International Human Rights
Law on Behalf of the Poor, in NEw DRcCnONs m HuMA RiHTs 109, 124 (E.
Lutz, H. Hannum & K. Burke eds. 1989).
1, Kaufman, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1980, § 6 (Magazine), 44.
-1 Id. at 52.
37 Id.
38 Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 25, at 87-89.
19 Id. at 90.
,0 Paust, Litigating Human Rights: A Commentary on the Comments, 4 Hous.
J. INT'L L. 81, 83-89 (1981).
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-Predictions of behavior of alleged torturers showed a certain naivete
towards the publicity a case like Filartiga would generate. It was said
the Filartiga would affect the decision of torturers to enter the United
States;41 that dictators could no longer rely on a safe haven in the
United States;42 likewise, that the United States would no longer be
considered a "rest home" for retired torturers;4 3 that a foreign at-
torney would advise his client to follow an alleged violator to the
United States;"4 and that Filartiga would show the lawyer how to
frame a claim. 45 Filartiga was hailed as the most significant domestic
case dealing with international law in this century," and that it "did
as much to assist the development of this body of international law
as Fujii did to retard it.''47
Most of those who applauded Filartiga recognized that there were
some limitations in its holding. Those problems most commonly
mentioned were applying the law of the situs when considering the
merits of the claim," the doctrine of forum non conveniens,4 9 and
the realization that consideration of such claims in domestic courts
might not be viewed favorably by the country involved.50 Despite
these problems, many felt that after Filartiga the Alien Tort Statute
"provides the best means by which to hold an individual or, perhaps,
a nation responsible for violation of human rights committed abroad." 5
B. Unfavorable
Without even reaching the jurisdictional questions, some questioned
whether it could be said that torture does violate the law of nations.
While not questioning the content of the various conventions and
" Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 25, at 113.
41 Developments in the Law, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala: Providing Federal Jurisdiction
for Human Rights Violations Through the Alien Tort Statute, 10 DENVER J. INT'L
L. 355, 359 (1981).
41 Bazyler, Litigating the International Law of Human Rights: A "How-To"
Approach, 7 Wsrrnr L. REv. 713, 724 (1985).
" Paust, supra note 40, at 82.
" Lillich, Invoking International Human Rights Law in Domestic Courts, 54 U.
CN. L. REv. 367, 401 (1985).
6 Note, The Domestic Application of International Human Rights Law: Evolving
the Species, 5 HASI Ncs INT'L & Comp. L. REv. 161, 177 (1981).
' Lillich, supra note 45, at 399.
, Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 25, at 98.
49 Id. at 103.
s Id. at 84.
" Bazyler, supra note 43, at 721.
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declarations, commentators focused on Filartiga's reliance on policy
rather than practice and the non-binding status of the cited decla-
rations.
The fact that torture exists in any country (especially one which
has ostensibly spoken out against torture) "discredits the notion that
torture has become a violation of international law because of the
usage and practice of nations. 5 2 The doubt that practice would be
ignored by other fora, such as the International Court of Justice
("ICJ"), was raised by some,53 based in part on an interpretation
of ICJ procedure that "it is only the actions of states that build up
practice, just as it is only practice .. . that constitutes a usage or
custom, and builds up eventually a rule of customary international
law." '54 Ironically, this view seems to ignore its corollary-that ab-
stention from a practice is proof of law, which is clearly not a valid
argument since there are reasons not to torture other than because
it violates a law."
The apparent elevation of non-binding treaties and declarations
into authoritative statements of law was another basis for criticism
of the Filartiga ruling5 6 To sustain an argument that a provision of
human rights law is law in a domestic court, some suggested it must
be shown that this effect was intended by national lawmakers. 7 The
Filartiga judges were criticized "for going farther than they had to
in applying, with great assurance, a consuetudinarian law of human
rights that in world terms may not be so assured."" In fact, the
5, Case Comment, Torture is a Tort in Violation of the Laws of Nations, Giving
Rise to Federal Jurisdiction Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1350 Whenever an Alleged
Torturer, Regardless of Nationality, is Served with Process by an Alien Within the
Border of the United States. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 49 U. CIN. L. REv. 880, 890
(1980).
13 See, e.g., Oliver, A Brief Replication: The Big 'Picture and Mr. Schneebaum's
Reply, 5 Hous. J. Ir~N'L L. 151, 154 (1982); Case Comment, 28 U.S.C. 1350: A
Legal Remedy for Torture in Paraguay?, 69 GEO. L.J. 833, 845 (1981) (hereinafter
A Legal Remedy).
-' Fitzmaurice, General Principles and Sources of Law, 30 BlUT. Y.B. INT'L L.
1, 68 (1953).
" Johnson, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala: A Contribution to the Development of Cus-
tomary International Law By a Domestic Court, 11 GA. J. INT'L & COmP. L. 335,
338 (1981).
See, e.g., A Legal Remedy, supra note 53, at 841; Johnson, supra note 55,
at 365, 372.
57 Comment, Symposium on International Human Rights Law in State Courts,
18 INT'L. L. 77 (1984).
5s Oliver, supra note 53, at 152.
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adopting Declaration Against Torture refers to it as a "guideline,"
not a binding statement.5 9
Aside from questioning the Filartiga conclusion about the law of
nations, some were concerned about the propriety of United States
courts considering this type of action, as an infringement on the
powers of the legislative and executive branches, 60 and the risk of
insulting the country where the act allegedly occurred. It was con-
tended that not only should the court have considered whether it had
the authority to hear the case, but that it should have considered
"the potential impact that exercising this authority might have on
the international community, especially given this country's ques-
tionable record as a genuine supporter of human rights." ' 6' Just how
the court could consider this issue while being mindful of not running
afoul of the separation of powers was not addressed by that author.
Other countries could view this exercise of jurisdiction as a form
of "moral imperialism" by the United States, 62 with the acceptance
of international norms on one hand, but with jurisprudence in Amer-
ican courts .63 "[I]f other countries passed similar domestic statutes
giving rise to local adjudication for international torts or wrongs
committed outside those countries, the results might be that many
foreign visitors to such countries would be liable to the kind of action
which neither the visitors nor their home states might like." 64
While those supporting Filartiga viewed it as a natural step in the
progression of recognition of human rights, critics thought it was
"manifestly contrary to the trend of the philosophy of international
protection of human rights."65 There is clear disagreement over whether
an individual should and does have the right to seek redress for
human rights violations, or whether that is an undesirable extension
of existing law. 66 There is the further question of whether an individual
can be held responsible for a human rights violation, to which a
19 D'Zurilla, Individual Responsibility for Torture Under International Law, 56
TuiL. L. REv. 186, 207 (1981).
60 A Legal Remedy, supra note 53, at 846.
61 Note, Enforcement of International Human Rights in the Federal Courts after
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 67 VA. L. REv. 1379, 1380 (1981)(hereinafter Enforcement).
62 Johnson, supra note 55, at 340.
63 Hassan, A Conflict of Philosophies: The Filartiga Jurisprudence, 32 INT. &
Comp. L. Q. 250, 256 (1983).
, Id. at 257.
6, Id. at 256.
6 Hassan, International Human Rights and the Alien Tort Statute: Past and
Future, 5 Hous. J. INT'L L. 131, 137 (1982).
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classicist would answer "no" but "modern international law" would
indicate yes. 67 While international law was said to contain a prohi-
bition against torture, the Filartiga court failed to examine whether
that same law would recognize an individual right of action against
an individual actor." This argument, however, ignores the issues which
actually had to be considered by the Filartiga court in construing a
statute which clearly gives an individual the right to sue another
individual. It was not necessary, nor appropriate, for the Filartiga
court to look to international law for any guidance other than to
answer the question of what constitutes a violation of the law of
nations.
The critics of Filartiga did not engage in the same sort of far-
flung predictions as did its proponents, other than raising an occa-
sional statement such as "the United States may begin to decline as
a center of commerce if prominent concerns become reluctant to
store assets or venture into the country.'' 69 Most opponents either
argued for restrictions on the application of Filartiga, or pointed out
that it could actually harm efforts to draw attention to human rights
violations.
The suggestions to limit Filartiga were usually along the line of
requiring a more specific directive from Congress before courts should
exercise jurisdiction. One author proposed a three-part framework
before jurisdiction should be granted:
1. The jurisdiction has been authorized by Congress and conforms
with the principles of international law;
2. There is a substantial international consensus that the alleged
wrongdoing is proscribed by international law; and
3. A preferable forum is not available.70
It is clear that this framework is not that much different from the
analysis made in Filartiga, and would not avoid the discussions which
followed the decision.
Not only were the problems of enforcing any judgment duly noted
by friend and foe of Filartiga,71 but it was argued that "such well-
67 D'Zurilla, supra note 59, at 188-89.
6 Id. at 202-07.
69 Case Comment, Internal Deed of Foreign Official Actionable in United States
Court, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 5 SuFFoLK TRANSNT'L L. J. 297, 306 (1981).
70 Enforcement, supra note 61, at 1390.
7, Johnson, supra note 55, at 335; Hassan, supra note 66, at 257; Burke, et al.,
supra note 28, at 322.
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motivated actions can do more harm than good ' 72 in providing the
illusion of a remedy, ("a mirage-a glimpse of an oasis in a desert, ' 73)
delaying and detracting attention from more rewarding means of
redress. Even the Department of Justice, in its brief urging jurisdic-
tion, admitted "[w]hen the parties and the conduct alleged in the
complaint have as little contact with the United States as they have
here, abstention is generally appropriate. '74
A prescient caveat focused on the weight of authority given to the
position of the Administration in Filartiga,"7 and the likelihood that
the executive departments "may well be less supportive of the court's
decision the next time this statute is interpreted, particularly in view
of the Reagan Administration's shift in foreign policy away from an
emphasis on human rights." 7 6
The discussion concerning remedies available to the plaintiff may
overlook a primary reason for bringing such claims. "[W]hat is the
primary object of the exercise-to win freedom for the victim by the
most effective and certain means at hand or to seize an opportunity
to propagandize human rights as international law?" ' 77 As illustrated
by Judge Kaufman's own participation in the publicity surrounding
Filartiga,78 judges must be "cautious not to become human rights
activists themselves" for this may result in a backlash against human
rights. 79 This warning was to be prophetic of subsequent decisions
addressing the Alien Tort Statute.
One of the most interesting commentaries on Filartiga, and one
gently negative, was that written by Dean Rusk,80 former Secretary
of State under Kennedy and Johnson, in which he characterized
Filartiga as "a legal oddity, not a landmark case with far-reaching
implications for the development of international law."'" Rusk was
72 Hassan, supra note 66, at 257.
11 Hassan, Panacea or Olivage? Domestic Enforcement of International Human
Rights Law: Recent Cases, 4 Hous. J. INT'L L. 13, 14 (1981).
1 Filartiga Brief, supra note 31, at 606 n. 48.
" Note, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala: A New Forum for Violations of International
Human Rights, 30 AM. UNv. L. REv. 807, 829 (1981).
Johnson, supra note 55, at 341.
Oliver, Problems of Cognition and Interpretation in Applying Norms of Cus-
tomary International Law of Human Rights in United States Courts, 4 Hous. J.
INT'L L. 59, 63 (1981).
71 See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
I Oliver, supra note 77.
0 Rusk, A Comment on Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 11 GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L.
311 (1981).
81 Id.
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especially concerned with relying on the Universal Declaration to
support the conclusion that torture violates the law of nations:
There is little doubt that a general legislative power vested in the
General Assembly would have prompted the Senate of the United
States to refuse advice and consent to the Charter .... There may
be those who think that the promotion of General Assembly Re-
solutions to the status of international law would be a major step
forward in the development of international law; they must keep
in mind, however, that any such assumed role would lead to the
breakup of the United Nations. 2
Rusk attributed the Filartiga ruling to an activist role by the court,
stating "[ilt is entirely understandable that common law judges might
feel that if such an act is not a violation of the law of nations, it
jolly well ought to be."1s3 Ironically, for a commentator well-versed
in the political arena of foreign relations, Rusk failed to acknowledge
the impact of the recommendation by the Justice and State Depart-
ments on the "common law judges' " ruling.
III. NARROWING FLAR7TGA
Two major cases since Filartiga clarified the view of prominent
judiciary toward the holding and cast doubt on its continued validity
as precedent in all but the narrowest of circumstances. The first case,
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic," was decided by the influential
Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, a far more conservative
panel than the Second Circuit. Adding to the weight of Tel-Oren,
the Supreme Court denied its petition for certiorari.
The second case, Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping
Corp. ,85 was decided by the Supreme Court in 1989. While it involved
a commercial tort, the holding in Amerada Hess directly limits the
situations in which a Filartiga-type claim could be brought.
A. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic 6
This case involved a claim by the survivors and personal repre-
sentatives of the casualties of a terrorist attack on a bus in Israel
on March 11, 1978. The suit was brought against the Libyan Arab
12 Id. at 314.
83 Id. at 311.
726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985).
85 830 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1987), rev'd, 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
Hanoch Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 517 F. Supp. 542, 544 (D.D.C.
1981).
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Republic, the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Palestine Infor-
mation Office, the National Association of Arab Americans, and the
Palestine Congress of North America. The plaintiffs alleged that the
acts of the defendants violated the law of nations, and that the court
therefore had jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute. 7
The district court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction and
failure to comply with the District of Columbia's one year statute
of limitations. The basic premise of the court's holding was that the
Alien Tort Statute is relevant for jurisdiction only, and that it does
not provide a cause of action.8 1 In other words, the plaintiffs must
show that a law has been violated and that the law envisions a specific
right to a private claim for the Alien Tort Statute to be the juris-
dictional basis.8 9 The court also expressed doubt as to whether the
"vague, conclusory allegations of conspiracy" would constitute a
violation of the law of nations. 90 The court was cognizant of and
relied upon some of the post-Filartiga scholarly writings.9'
The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal to the Court of Appeals,
which issued a terse, four paragraph per curiam decision affirming
the dismissal. 92 What followed, however, was anything but terse -
fifty-two pages of concurring opinions from three Circuit judges,
each of whom had different reasons for upholding the dismissal.
Judge Edwards supported the Filartiga holding, but felt the law
of nations could not be extended to apply to acts of non-state actors
like the PLO, as opposed to those acting under color of state law,
like Pena-Irala. 93 He said that Filartiga stood for four propositions:
1. The "law of nations" is not stagnant and should be construed
as it exists today among the nations of the world.
2. One source of that law is the customs and usages of civilized
nations, as articulated by jurists and commentators.
3. International law today places limits on a state's power to torture
persons held in custody, and confers "fundamental rights upon all
people" to be free from torture.
4. Section 1350 opens the federal courts for adjudication of the
rights already recognized by international law.Y
'1 Id. at 544-45.
81 Id. at 549.
89 Id.
o Id.
9, Id., citing Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 25; Stanford Note, supra note 33.
92 726 F.2d at 775.
91 Id. at 776.
94 Id. at 777.
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Because Justice Edwards agreed with these principles, and Judges
Bork and Robb did not, he wrote separately.
Justice Edwards stated that the Alien Tort Statute provides its own
cause of action. It would be incongruous to look to international
law for a cause of action, as that would in effect require that
international law provide domestic remedies. "[T]o require interna-
tional accord on a right to sue, when in fact the law of nations
relegates decisions on such questions to the states themselves, would
be to effectively nullify the 'law of nations' portion of section 1350,"
a result not permitted by standard rules of statutory construction."
Edwards pointed out that Judge Bork would read into the Alien
Tort Statute three offenses which would have violated the law of
nations in 1789-violation of safe-conducts, infringement of the rights
of ambassadors, and piracy. The recognition of these causes of action
implied by the Alien Tort Statute is inconsistent with the argument
that it does not create a private cause of action. 96
Additionally, Edwards noted that the Alien Tort Statute addresses
a "violation" of the law of nations, not an action "arising under"
the laws as is stated in 28 U.S.C. § 133 1, another jurisdictional statute
which has been held to require an independent cause of action. 97 The
paucity of case law interpreting the statute makes finding precedent
difficult, but Edwards' view was consistent with a 1907 opinion of
the United States Attorney General that the Alien Tort Statute pro-
vides both a right to sue and a forum. 9
Edwards would also permit jurisdiction under an alternative in-
terpretation of the Alien Tort Statute-that it provides federal court
jurisdiction over claims by aliens for common law torts.99 Edwards
position had been adopted by one pre-Filartiga case'0° and is similar
to the proposal made in at least one post-Filartiga commentary.' 0'
Such an approach would lessen the burden of determining what
constitutes a violation of the law of nations.1° Edwards would limit
these cases to claims for torts that occur in United States territory
Id. at 778.
9 Id. at 778-79.
" Id. at 779.
See 26 Op. Att'y Gen. 250, 251-53 (1907).
Id. at 782.
10 Adra v. Clift, 195 F.Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961).
10, Stanford Note, supra note 33 and accompanying text.
102 726 F.2d at 787.
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and injure "substantial rights,"'' 3 or involve "universal crimes," or
"torts committed by Americans abroad.'' 4
As for whether courts should, for policy reasons, abstain from
considering such claims, Edwards believed that permitting jurisdiction
under a statute is less intrusive on congressional authority than de-
clining to exercise jurisdiction for fear of exacerbating tensions.1°5 "I
am the first to admit that section 1350 presents difficulties in im-
plementation, but to construe it out of existence on that ground is
to usurp Congress' role and contravene its will."' ' 6 Edwards noted
that state courts have the power to hear tort claims brought by aliens,
regardless of the interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute, and to deny
federal jurisdiction would not eliminate the power of a state court
to adjudicate, which could be more intrusive on foreign relations
than federal court action.1°7
Despite his agreement with Filartiga, Edwards felt the Tel-Oren
claim was non-cognizable as it alleged acts by persons operating
outside the dictates of international law. 08 The degree of international
consensus on official torture is not present when faced with individual
action not taken under color of state law.'09 "[Flor each article
sounding the arrival of individual rights and duties under the law of
nations, another surveys the terrain and concludes that there is a
long distance to go."" 0
Edwards looked for and failed to find consensus on whether ter-
rorism can be a violation of the law of nations,"' thus providing
another basis for declining to exercise jurisdiction. He disagreed,
however, with Judge Robb's conclusion that jurisdiction should be
withheld because the case raised a "nonjusticiable political ques-
tion."" 2 Edwards believed that ambiguity in a statute does not entitle
103 Id. at 788; see also 26 Op. Att'y Gen. 250, 252-53 (1907).
-0, 726 F.2d at 788.
05 Id. at 789.
"0 Id. at 790.
,0, Id. Edwards points out that section 1350 has twice been recognized by the
Supreme Court as "a statutory example of congressional intent to make questions
likely to affect foreign relations originally cognizable in federal courts." Id. at 790-
91, citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 n.25 (1964);
Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 27-30 n.6 (1942).
'10 726 F.2d at 792.
109 Id.
I° d. at 794.
Id. at 795-96.
Id. at 796-98.
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a court to retreat from hard questions under such "facile labels" as
nonjusticiability, since the political question doctrine precludes review
only of acts of recognized governments within their own territory." 3
Judge Bork's primary objection to granting jurisdiction was that
the statute provided no cause of action. Bork said "it is essential
that there be an explicit grant of a cause of action before a private
plaintiff be allowed to enforce principles of international law in a
federal tribunal," ' 4 because of the effect this would have on the
conduct of foreign relations-a power committed to the executive
and legislative branches."' Bork supported his position that the claim
was essentially political by pointing to a statement by plaintiffs that
one of the primary purposes of the attack had been to sabotage the
foreign relations of the United States by affecting the positive efforts
made in the Camp David accords." 6
Bork echoed Edwards' points concerning international law imposing
duties only on states and the lack of consensus on terrorism, but
criticized Edwards for finding support for a cause of action in treaties
which are not self-executing." 7 By taking such a position, Bork said
the effect was to make the treaties self-executing.
Bork then applied his typical approach of using "original intent"
to determine what causes of action could be asserted under the Alien
Tort Statute."8 As discussed previously," 9 Bork said only those alien
tort actions recognized by Blackstone, "a writer certainly familiar
with colonial lawyers,"' 20 could be brought under the Alien Tort
Statute. To permit human rights claims, a concept unknown in 1789,1l
would "conflict with the primary purpose of the adoption of the law
of nations by federal law-to promote American's peaceful relations
with other nations."' 22 It would be "breathtaking folly" to conclude
that the United States of 1789, a "young, weak nation" would
"undertake casually and without debate to regulate the conduct of
113 Id.
114 Id. at 801.
"I Id. Bork based his argument in large part on Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), a case applying the act of state doctrine.
226 726 F.2d at 805.
117 Id. at 812.
"I Id. at 812-13.
,,9 Supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
120 726 F.2d at 813.
121 Id.
121 Id. at 816.
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other nations and individuals abroad."'' 2 Bork said that permitting
jurisdiction would cause the United States to be perceived "as an
officious interloper and an international busybody."' 24
Judge Robb declined jurisdiction on the basis of the political ques-
tion doctrine, a basis also cited favorably by Bork. 25 Robb felt that
the case involved standards beyond the purview of a court, such as
whether terrorism is a tort and who bears individual responsibility. 26
Further, he felt that any discussion as to the status of a group such
as the PLO should be made only by the political branch, not a court,
and that even Bork went too far in addressing the status of the
PLO. 27 Robb envisioned the courts becoming overwhelmed by un-
answerable questions and the "transformation of trials into forums
for the exposition of political propaganda."'I He said courts would
become "debating clubs for professors" with plaintiffs "trooping"
to court, marshalling their experts behind them.' 29 "It is too glib to
assert simply that courts are used to dealing with difficult questions.
They are not used to this kind of question.' ' 30
Tel-Oren thus provided a forum for three judges with three different
opinions on why Filartiga could not be extended. Of the three, Judge
Robb took perhaps the harshest step by calling for abstention in all
cases of this sort on the basis of nonjusticiability and the political
question doctrine. While attracted by the easy out of the political
question doctrine, Bork relied primarily on the lack of a cause of
action in the Alien Tort Statute, and the need for a clear statement
due to the sensitivity -of foreign relations. Edwards was the only judge
who showed any affinity for Filartiga, but he would limit it to claims
against states or those acting under color of state law and alleging
acts of universal repugnance.
B. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corporation13 '
This case, while seemingly distinguishable from Filartiga due to its
commercial nature, stands for yet another limitation on Filartiga's
'2 Id. at 821.
124 Id.
"I Id. at 823.
126 Id. at 823-24.
127 See id. at 824.
128 Id. at 826.
129 See id. at 827.
130 Id.
131 488 U.S. at 428.
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continued use. This action arose out of a claim by the owner of a
Liberian oil tanker for damage sustained when the tanker was bombed
during the Falkland Islands war. Among other things, the action was
brought under the Alien Tort Statute for an alleged violation of the
right of a neutral ship to free passage on the high seas.
The Second Circuit (with two of the three Filartiga judges) held
that jurisdiction should be upheld as the allegations involved clear
violations of international law 32 and the Alien Tort Statute provides
jurisdiction over sovereign states. 3 3 One of the original Filartiga
judges dissented, stating that he was now skeptical of tying jurisdiction
to the "ebb and flow [of) the vicissitudes of 'evolving standards of
international law." ' 134
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act'3- takes precedence over the Alien Tort Statute and
does not permit jurisdiction over a sovereign state. 36 While not
directly affecting the continued validity of Filartiga, Amerada Hess
precludes acts against a sovereign under the Alien Tort Statute.
Further, the Court in dicta stated that certain conventions cited by
the appellants "only set forth substantive rules of conduct and state
that compensation shall be paid for certain wrongs. They do not
create private rights of action for foreign corporations to recover
compensation from foreign states in United States courts."' 137 This
language seems to support Bork's Tel-Oren argument about the need
for a cause of action in addition to the jurisdictional statute.
C. Reaction
While Amerada Hess is too recent to have much published analysis,
Tel-Oren has been roundly criticized by those who praised Filartiga.
Unlike the Second Circuit, the D.C. Circuit acted in "abdication of
the responsibility assigned to the courts by Congress' '1 38 "which will
slam shut the door opened by Filartiga."'3 9 Judge Bork's opinion
32 830 F.2d at 423.
"I Id. at 425.
1I /d. at 429 (Kearse, J., dissenting).
." 28 U.S.C. § 1330 et seq.
11 488 U.S. at 428.
137 Id.
I's Recent Development, Separation of Powers and Adjudication of Human Rights
Claims Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 60 WASH. L. REv. 697, 715 (1985).
,39 Wellbaum, International Human Rights Claims After Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic: Swan Song for the Legal Lohengrin?, 9 HAsTiNcs INT'L & Comp. L. REV.
107, 147 (1985).
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was scrutinized most, perhaps because it seemed "most scholarly,"' 4
but also because it was seen to effectively preclude an alien from
raising any claim of international law. '4' The basis for Bork's decision
was seen to be his "hostility or resistance to the notion of domestically
enforceable rights arising under customary international human rights
law.''' 4 2
Not only was Bork criticized, but so were the Tel-Oren plaintiffs.
Tel-Oren was "a judicial disaster that might have been avoided had
minimal research been undertaken prior to the commencement of
suit." ' 43 It was a "misguided attempt to establish that acts of 'in-
ternational terrorism' violate customary international law and hence
are actionable under the Alien Tort Statute .... [E]ven cursory
research by counsel would have revealed that customary international
law as yet contains no general prohibition of terrorism."'" Lillich's
assertion on this point is undermined by Edwards' citation to several
authorities for the proposition that terrorism could be said to violate
international law,'45 and other commentators who say the court could
have concluded terrorism is a violation of the law of nations.'4
Perhaps because Judge Edwards did such a thorough job of re-
butting Judge Bork, few analysts did more than just disagree with
Bork. One did note the early (1820) recognition of the evolving nature
of international law as calling into question Bork's reliance on original
intent; 147 that Bork's position would require an element of proof
which the statute does not, violating a basic law of statutory con-
struction;'" and would render the Alien Tort Statute superfluous
,40 D'Amato, What Does Tel-Oren Tell Lawyers? Judge Bork's Concept of the
Law of Nations is Seriously Mistaken, 79 Ai. J. INT'L L. 92 (1985).
14 Id. at 100; Note, Enforcing International Human Rights Law in Federal Courts:
The Alien Tort Statute and the Separation of Powers, 74 GEO. L.J. 163, 179 (1985).
,42 Hartman, Enforcement of International Human Rights Law in State and Federal
Courts, 7 WmHrER L. Rv. 741, 749 (1985). Hartman was one of the drafters of
the Government's Brief in Filartiga.
"43 Lillich, supra note 45, at 414-15 n. 227.
"4 Id. at 401 n. 161.
14 726 F.2d at 795-96.
- See, e.g., Wellbaum, supra note 139, at 125; Comment, International Terrorism:
Beyond the Scope of International Law: Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 12
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 505, 549 (1986).
7 See, Randall, Federal Jurisdiction Over International Law Claims: Inquiries
Into the Alien Tort Statute, 18 N.Y.U.J. Irr'L L. & POL. 1, 40-46 (1985), citing
United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160-61 (1820).
I" Randall, Further Inquiries Into the Alien Tort Statute and a Recommendation,
18 N.Y.U.J. INr'L L. & POL. 473, 479-80 (1986).
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because federal question jurisdiction could be used where an explicit
cause of action was present.'49 Another commentator observed that
the historical background of the statute was inconsistent with a narrow
application, noting that in a 1781 resolution the Continental Congress
recognized that Blackstone's three violations of the law of nations
were not exclusive." 0 These points cast doubt on the academic bases
for Bork's opinion, scholarly though it may appear.
As of yet, there is little criticism of the Amerada Hess holding,
although there have been many calls to amend the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act so as to permit jurisdiction when a foreign sovereign
violates international law.' There is an argument to be made, as
was stated by Justices Blackmun and Marshall in their concurring
opinion, that an exception to immunity could be implied in the case
of violations of international law. 52
IV. CASE LAW SINCE FILARTIGA
Although a number of claims have been brought in reliance on
Filartiga, their results and those of non-Alien Tort Statute cases
interpreting Filartiga show mainly what will not be considered by
United States courts. The Alien Tort Statute will not confer juris-
diction over the following claims: An action by a Colombian winner
of the New York lottery for lump-sum payment of lottery winnings;'53
breach of contract; 5 4 fraud; 5 conversion; 5 6 damage caused by the
149 Id. at'481.
so Casto, The Federal Courts' Protective Jurisdiction Over Torts Committed in
Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REv. 467, 499 (1986).
"I See, e.g., Comment, Must the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act Bar Inter-
national Human Rights Claims?, 23 SAN DEGo L. REv. 741, 759-60 (1986); Note,
Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic: Denying Sovereign Immunity
to Violators of International Law, 39 HASTNGS L.J. 1109 (1988).
152 - U.S. , 109 S.Ct. at 692-93. See also, Belsky, Merva & Roht-Arriaza,
Implied Waiver Under the FSIA: A Proposed Exception to Immunity for Violations
of Peremptory Norms of International Laws, 77 CALIF. L. REv. 365, 394 (1989).
"I Zapata v. Quinn, 707 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1983). The Alien Tort Statute "applies
only to shockingly egregious violations of universally recognized principles of in-
ternational law." Id. at 692.
114 Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 320, 325 n.16 (2d Cir.
1981), rev'd on other grounds, 461 U.S. 480 (1983).
"I Trans-Continental Inv. Corp. v. Bank of Commonwealth, 500 F. Supp. 565
(C.D. Cal. 1980).
156 Security Pacific National Bank v. Derderian, 872 F.2d 281, 285 n.8 (9th Cir.
1989).
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1986 United States airstrike on Libya;"7 purely local actions;"58 suits
arising out of public acts of the sovereign;5 9 employment-related
torts;160 wrongful death; 6' embezzlement; 62 eavesdropping by the
state; 63 first amendment violations;'" expropriation of property by
a state; 65 and suits against foreign states.' 66
The Alien Tort Statute also could not be used to support a claim
by Nicaraguan citizens that the actions of executives of the United
States in supporting the Nicaraguan contras violated any treaty or
customary international law. 67 That opinion, written by present Su-
preme Court Justice Scalia, relies on the same original intent argument
favored by Judge Bork in Tel-Oren.'"
A number of cases rely on Filartiga as a basis for determining
what international law is, including at least one which relied on the
UN Charter to prove that Connecticut state prison conditions were
unconstitutional. 69 As in that case, most of these cases are efforts
15 Saltany v. Reagan, 886 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, - U.S.
, 110 S. Ct. 2172 (1990). This action, also brought against the United Kingdom
and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, was considered by the court to be so
groundless that sanctions were imposed against the plaintiffs.
I' Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 724 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1983), reh'g en
banc, 745 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985).
19 Republic of Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1369-70 (9th Cir. 1988)
(Schroeder, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, - U.S.
, 109 S.Ct. 1933 (1989); Republic of Philippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344, 358
(2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, New York Land Co. v. Republic of Philippines, 481
U.S. 1048 (1987). Review of such cases is precluded under the act of state doctrine.
6 De Wit v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, N.V., 570 F. Supp. 613, 618 (S.D.N.Y.
1983).
161 Jones v. Petty Ray Geophysical Geosource, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 343, 348 (S.D.
Tex. 1989).
162 Cohen v. Hartman, 490 F. Supp. 517 (S.D. Fla. 1980), aff'd, 634 F.2d 318
(5th Cir. 1981).
163 United States v. Covos, 872 F.2d 805 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, - U.S.
, 110 S.Ct. 124 (1989)(warrantless use of a pen register does not violate customary
principles of international law).
'6 Guinto v. Marcos, 654 F. Supp. 276 (S.D. Cal. 1986); Akbar v. New York
Magazine Co., 490 F. Supp. 60 (D.D.C. 1980).
16, De Sanchez v. Banco Central De Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1985);
Jafari v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 539 F. Supp. 209 (N.D. 111. 1982).
- Siderman v. Argentina, No. CV82-1772-RMT (D. Cent. Cal. Mar. 7, 1985)(1984
WL 9080).
67 Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
Id. at 206-07.
169 Lareau v. Manson, 507 F. Supp. 1177 (D. Conn. 1980), aff'd in part, 651
F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1981).
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to show that some domestic activity is a violation of international
law. 170
Only two cases since Filartiga could be said to rely directly upon
it as precedent and even expand its application. In Von Dardel v.
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 71 a claim was brought under
the Alien Tort Statute by the half brother of Raoul Wallenberg, a
Swedish diplomat allegedly arrested, imprisoned and possibly killed
by representatives of the Soviet Union in 1945. Although the Soviet
Union did not respond to the suit, and raised no defenses, the district
court carefully addressed all of the arguments raised by the D.C.
Circuit Court in Tel-Oren, and distinguished Tel-Oren on every point.'7
The detention of a diplomat by a state would clearly violate the law
of nations, satisfying the concerns of Judge Edwards. 7 Such an act
would have been in violation of the law of nations even in 1789,
which was the thrust of Judge Bork's concern in Tel-Oren. 74 Further,
given the universality of condemnation for interference with diplo-
mats, the court reasoned that adherence to clear international law
would not interfere in a politically sensitive area, Judge Robb's basis
for dismissing Tel-Oren.1'5 The court was not concerned about the
running of the statute of limitations as plaintiffs alleged Wallenberg
was still alive, making his detention a continuing violation. 76 The
,7 See, e.g., Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 622 F. Supp. 887 (D. Ga. 1985) and
Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787 (1980)(Mariel Cuban cases); United States
v. Buck, 690 F. Supp. 1291 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)(motion to dismiss indictments against
persons of African ancestry who committed allegedly criminal acts in their efforts
to establish "Republic of New Afrika," a country consisting of Mississippi, Alabama,
Louisiana, Georgia and South Carolina); Ishtyaq v. Nelson, 627 F. Supp. 13 (E.D.N.Y.
1983)(claim that detention by INS of Afghan and Iranian refugees was not invalid
as violative of UN Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees). In Handel v.
Artukovic, 601 F. Supp. 1421 (C.D. Cal. 1985), a claim was brought by U.S. citizens(formerly Yugoslavian citizens) against Andrija Artukovic for acts he allegedly com-
mitted against Yugoslav Jews in World War II. The case was not brought under
the Alien Tort Statute and did not directly rely on Filartiga, but did conclude that
the alleged acts would constitute a violation against the laws of humanity at the
time they were committed. Id. at 1429. The case was dismissed, however, as it was
not brought within the applicable municipal one year statute of limitations.
171 623 F. Supp. 246 (D.D.C. 1985).
'7 The lead attorney, at least on appeal, was Anthony D'Amato, the author of
an article (supra note 140) critical of Justice Bork's opinion in Tel-Oren.
623 F. Supp. at 257.
174 Id. at 258.
I" Id. at 258-29.
176 Id. at 260-61.
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Von Dardel court entered a default judgment for the plaintiffs, but
a damage amount was not stated. Although Von Dardel was not
appealed, it is of no precedential value in light of the Supreme Court's
subsequent decision in Amerada Hess that the Alien Tort Statute
does not provide jurisdiction over a foreign state. 177
Despite the predictions after Filartiga and the efforts to apply it,
there is only one case of record which reached a similar, even broader,
result. Forti v. Suarez-Mason 78 was an action under the Alien Tort
Statute by Argentine citizens against former Argentine General Suarez-
Mason for damages arising out of alleged torture, murder and pro-
longed arbitrary detention by military and police personnel under
Suarez-Mason's authority and control. The court adopted Judge Ed-
wards' reasoning in Tel-Oren, holding that it was not necessary for
the plaintiffs to establish an independent cause of action. 179 The court
further agreed with Edwards that for the purpose of determining
whether international law was violated, the court would consider the
law as it existed at the time the acts were allegedly committed, not
as of 1789.190
The court held that allegations of official torture constituted a
violation of the law of nations,18' as did prolonged arbitrary de-
tention, 18 2 summary execution, 8 3 and "causing disappearance."'s4 The
'" Supra notes 131-37 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court singled out
Von Dardel as a unique example of a court exercising jurisdiction over a foreign
state. -U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 689 n.4.
-' 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987), motion to reconsider granted in part, 694
F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
1 672 F. Supp. at 1539.
- Id. at 1539-40.
81 Id. at 1541 (citing Filartiga).
,1 672 F. Supp. at 1541-42, [citing Rodriquez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F.
Supp. 787, 795-98 (D. Kan. 1980), aff'd, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981)]; De Sanchez
v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385, 1397 (5th Cir. 1985); Nguyen Da
Yen v. Kissinger, 528 F.2d 1194, 1201 n.13 (9th Cir. 1975); and RESTATEMENT
(REVISED) OF THE FoREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702 (Tent. Draft
No. 6, 1985)(hereinafter RESTATEMENT).
113 672 F. Supp. at 1542, [citing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the American Convention on
Human Rights; Tel-Oren; and the RESTATEMENT].
IN Matter of Extradition of Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 676, at 710 (N.D. Cal.
1988), [citing United Nations General Assembly Resolution 33/173; the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; 22 U.S.C. § 2304(d)(1); and the RESTATE-
MENTI. The court had originally held that there was not sufficient proof -to show
that "customary international law creates a presumption of causing disappearance
upon a showing of prolonged absence after initial custody." 672 F. Supp. at 1543.
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court refused to extend law of nations status to a claim for "cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment," stating that as a tort it was not
a "universal, definable, and obligatory international norm .. 85
As in the Filartiga case, there could be no real satisfaction of any
judgment against Suarez-Mason as he was extradited to Argentina
prior to the court's last opinion.'8 6
V. THE FUTURE OF LITIGATION UNDER THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE
The Restatement of Foreign Relations (Third), drafted by the Amer-
ican Law Institute, is a highly respected, widely cited compilation of
maxims about foreign relations. In defining what constitutes a vio-
lation of the law of nations, the Restatement provides that there
should be a cause of action where a state practices, encourages or
condones genocide, slavery or slave trade, murder or causing dis-
appearance, torture or cruel and inhuman punishment, prolonged
arbitrary detention, systematic racial discrimination, or consistent
patterns of gross violations of internationally protected human rights.'87
The listing of violations in this domestic treatise gives strong support
to anyone attempting to prove universality and consensus sufficient
to a claim of violation of the law of nations for purposes of the
Alien Tort Statute.'88
On the other hand, the Justice Department, which so strongly
supported jurisdiction in Filartiga, has radically altered its interpre-
tation of the Alien Tort Statute. In Trajano v. Marcos,'I 9 not only
did the Justice Department fail to join an amici brief drafted by
some of the same attorneys who were involved in the Justice De-
"85 672 F. Supp. at 1540-41.
386 694 F. Supp. 676.
17 RESTATEMENT, supra note 182, at § 702, pp. 161-75. § 703, at pp. 175-83,
discusses remedies for these violations.
I' A domestic source of law may be more acceptable than a foreign one. "A
United States court may be reluctant to expressly find that United States domestic
law protecting human rights has significant 'gaps' which it can fill only by drawing
on international law sources, or that the United States has something to learn in
this regard from other nations." Bilder, Integrating International Human Rights
Law Into Domestic Law - U.S. Experience, 4 Hous. J. INT'L L. 1, 9 (1981).
- No. 86-2448 (9th Cir. 1989). The Ninth Circuit has not yet addressed the
question of jurisdiction under the .Alien Tort Statute in this matter, but reversed
the district court's dismissal under the act of state doctrine, 878 F.2d 1439 (9th Cir.
1989) (table). The case was remanded to the district court for consideration of "the
difficult question of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1350." (WESTLAW, 9th Cir.
database).
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partment's Filartiga brief, but it argued that the Alien Tort Statute
is "simply frivolous" and should apply only where the tort was
committed by a United States citizen or someone under the jurisdiction
of the United States; where the United States might be held ac-
countable; where Congress has specifically passed a criminal statute;
or where the plaintiffs can demonstrate a private right of action.19°
This shift in attitude, coupled with Tel-Oren, Amerada Hess and the
appointment of Judge Scalia to the Supreme Court, suggests that an
expansive reading of the Alien Tort Statute may be a thing of the
past or a relic of district court opinions.
One proposal to remedy the problems of interpreting the Alien
Tort Statute is to enact a new law. In 1986, a Congressional bill was
introduced to amend the UN Participation Act of 1945 in order to
make provisions against torture and extrajudicial killings applicable
to federal courts, and to give individuals a private right of action in
federal district courts against persons who acted under color of law. 19'
Although the bill was favorably reported out of the House Committee
on Foreign Affairs,'9 no action was taken. There has been some
discussion of amending the Alien Tort Statute itself, 93 but this too
has not been done.
VI. WHAT DOES FAR77A STAND FOR IN 1990?
It is easy to identify the problems inherent in prosecuting a Filartiga-
type claim. The defendant must be amenable to service of process
in the United States. The only clearly cognizable claims, assuming
the court does not require an explicit cause of action as Judge Bork
190 Cole, Lobel & Koh, Interpreting the Alien Tort Statute: Amicus Curiae Mem-
orandum of International Law Scholars and Practitioners in Trajano v. Marcos, 12
HASnNGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 1, 9 (1988).
-9- H.R. 4756, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); H.R. 1417, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987); S. 824, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). For a discussion of the bill, see Note,
The Torture Victim Protection Act: Legislation to Promote Enforcement of the
Human Rights of Aliens in U.S. Courts, 25 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 673
(1987)(hereinafter cited as TVPA); and Schochet, A New Role for an Old Rule:
Local Remedies and Expanding Human Rights Jurisdiction Under the Torture Victim
Protection Act, 19 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. Rnv. 223 (1987).
192 H.R. REP. No. 693, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
193 TVPA, supra note 191, at 714 n. 167, states that Sens. Metzenbaum (D-Ohio)
and Leahy (D-Vt.) have considered a clarifying amendment that would state that
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Randall, supra note 148, at 511-32.
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would, are for torture, Blackstone's original violations of the law of
nations, and perhaps a few Forti-based allegations. There are also
problems with complying with the statute of limitations; proving that
the defendant, not a state, was acting under color of state law, not
individually; showing that the court is the proper forum to consider
the case (i.e., that the doctrine of forum non conveniens does not
apply); that all indispensable parties are available; that the applicable
law, usually that of the locus of the tort, provides a remedy; and
that the claim is not nonjusticiable because of the political question
or act of state doctrines. If a favorable judgment is rendered, it is
likely to be by default or unenforceable due to the extradition or
deportation of the defendant (how likely is it that someone who has
committed acts in violation of the law of nations is not deportable
or extraditable?).
Many question whether United States courts should seek to exercise
jurisdiction in such matters. Could this, as Hassan believes, stymie
prospects for the development of international triburials to consider
such claims?194 Is it an undesirable example of nationalism which
runs afoul of the sovereignty of other states?
While there has been much written about these points, little has
been said about the psychological and academic value of Filartiga,
aside from its value as an individual remedy. 9 Unquestionably, such
an action can result in a moral and even political victory for plaintiffs,
both domestically and internationally. Perhaps because of the failure
of Filartiga to result in widespread, successful litigation, some com-
mentators are now focusing on its value outside of providing a remedy:
One of the most successful uses of international human rights law
has been to generate publicity. The novelty of the international
perspective, particularly where a case has been raised in an inter-
national forum, is appealing to the media. The impact of the media
on resolving a case must not be underestimated. 96
,94 "[There is something fundamentally wrong with a United States domestic court
becoming a forum for litigation between citizens of foreign governments and their
governments." Hassan, International Human Rights and the Alien Tort Statute:
Past and Future, 5 Hous. J. Iwr'L. L. 131, 150 (1982).
,91 For typical examples of this kind of critique, see Recent Decisions, Federal
Jurisdiction of Alleged Torturer Under the Alien Tort Statute, 6 INT'L TRADE L.
J. 289 (1981); George, Defining Filartiga: Characterizing International Torture Claims
in United States Courts, 3 DICK. J. INT'L L. 1 (1984).
'9 Rosenbaum, supra note 34.
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This publicity can also promulgate novel theories, fresh approaches,
promote human rights, and convince colleagues. 197 Likewise, one
effect of Filartiga has been to "bridg[e] the traditional gap between
international human rights activists and domestic civil liberties prac-
titioners" and "stimulat[e] ... continuing efforts in the United States
to use domestic courts to defend and enforce international human
rights."1 98
This type of analysis and examination of Filartiga seems more
appropriate now than mere expressions of support or disagreement,
or grandiose predictions and dire warnings of events to come. There
is also fertile ground for examination of the political aspects of judicial
interpretation and abstention in this area, focusing especially on the
shift in the Department of Justice's position and the deference given
by the courts to expressions by the Executive Branch; the basis for
the lengthy and somewhat acrimonious opinions in Tel-Oren; and the
political effect of judicial abstention based on the "political question"
doctrine- does abstention have as much political impact as consid-
eration of the claim would have?
The holdings and impact of Filartiga and its progeny are far more
complex than would appear from the usual treatment in human rights
texts, which generally run along the lines of "Filartiga was a rec-
ognition by a United States court that torture is a violation of the
law of nations, but [sometimes admitted] Tel-Oren may limit this
holding." It is naive and unrealistic to conclude that Filartiga helped
or hurt the cause of international human rights enforcement, for such
a conclusion depends so much on what is sought to be accomplished.
Filartiga did begin a dialogue, and for that it informs the field. The
caveat in analyzing its impact is to view it not in a vacuum, or as
an end in itself, but as a significant point in the continuing process
of defining and interpreting human rights.
97 Id. at 124-28.
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